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 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
NETWORKS OF INFORMATION 
 
 
The previous chapter emphasised that while printed information might have been abundant, 
its utility for the active investor was questionable. The slow speed at which newspapers were 
printed and circulated meant that many investors would have found it necessary to seek their 
information from more direct sources and the price list could offer little to the active investor 
who would have understood that price was meaningless unless it was considered in the 
context of a company‟s past history, current performance and prospects for the future. 
Consequently, to be well-informed the investor had to gain access to a complex information 
network, which may have included newspapers and price currents, but was also created 
through letters between acquaintances and business contacts, and in face-to-face meetings, 
most notably via conversations conducted, or overheard, in the Royal Exchange or the coffee 
houses of London. The aim of this chapter is to investigate how those networks operated to 
supply financial information to early modern investors. First, it will examine the nature of the 
physical space in which information circulated. The second section will investigate the extent 
to which full information was available to early modern investors. The final part of the 
chapter will concentrate on those who created networks of information and will ask how 
information spread from the City to all interested parties. 
 
Exchange Alley  
 
In 1688 Joseph de la Vega wrote that three things moved the market in Amsterdam: „the 
conditions in India, European politics, and opinion on the stock exchange itself‟ but he 
cautioned, because of the gambling of speculators news was often of little value since it was 
 impossible to know how the market would react in any given situation.
1
 Undoubtedly, de la 
Vega was right to assume that it was not easy to predict the impact of information upon share 
prices, yet there is still every reason to believe that economic and political news continued to 
inform the actions of Dutch investors. It is also reasonable to suppose that London‟s financial 
market was similarly responsive to news from India and the progress of the political situation 
in Europe. Furthermore, since the London market was far more diverse than its counterpart in 
Amsterdam, domestic politics and economic conditions must be thought of as equally 
important influences on the actions of English investors.  
London‟s financial market was well placed to attract such information. In particular, 
the City benefited from England‟s „exceptional political and economic centralization‟.2 
London was the seat of political power and the connections between Westminster and 
Whitehall and the City were strong. Wealthy London merchants remained the key source of 
government funds and the Treasury was, at this time, reliant upon the innovation of private 
individuals in its search for funding solutions. The main moneyed companies, such as the East 
India Company and the Bank of England, were as much political entities as economic ones. 
They were dependent on government for the protection of their monopolies, and companies 
used lobbyists in an attempt to promote their business in Parliament and at Court. In July 
1679, for example, John Verney, on behalf of the Royal African Company, spent a day at 
Windsor where he had „discourse with…Sunderland and afterwards with His Majesty‟.3 Even 
the smaller companies used lobbyists. In 1690 the White Paper Company employed William 
Sutton of Byfleet in Surrey as an agent to promote a petition requesting the encouragement 
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 and better establishment of white paper manufacture.
4
 Thus, close connections were built 
between London‟s political and financial centres that facilitated the flow of information.  
London was also England‟s major port and the heart of her economy. Trade and 
manufacturing was concentrated in and around the capital and, as Defoe noted, the provinces 
were largely dependent „…upon the city of London…for the consumption of [their] 
produce‟.5 Goods, services and migrants flowed into London from the provinces bringing 
with them fresh news and creating further networks of information.
6
 Similarly, news from 
abroad flowed into London through the movement of foreign merchants and overseas traders. 
Business correspondence and the personal letters of merchants and other individuals added to 
the influx of information.
7
 In the late seventeenth century it was standard practice to include 
relevant economic and political information, along with the prices of major commodities, in 
business letters. This type of information, although directed at specific individuals, would 
have been rapidly disseminated amongst other interested parties.  
Assessing the effectiveness of such networks of information is not easy and 
undoubtedly experiences varied. Neal and Quinn argue that the networks established by some 
merchants and bankers were sufficient to allow arbitrage of exchange rate anomalies, 
indicating that some individuals were able to establish a highly efficient and consistent system 
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 of information exchange.
8
 Nevertheless, as Samuel Jeake‟s brief interest in East India 
Company stock in mid- to late-1694 showed, it was not always so easy to find reliable 
information. On 27 July 1694 Jeake received notice from his correspondent Thomas Miller 
that „East India stock was upon a Critical point, by reason the Dutch had 8 ships arrived; & 
they bought no news of 2 or 3 of ours which were expected, which if they arrived before 
Michaelmas, the stock would rise considerably; if not, or if they miscarried it would fall much 
lower…‟.9 Further entries in Jeake‟s diary clearly demonstrate the rise and fall of the share 
price as the rumours of the ships‟ arrival or miscarriage were heard in London. On 20 August 
1694 Jeake received a report that East India Company stock „was fallen to 77…upon a Report 
that 2 ships were miscarried‟.10 On 4 October he received word that there was „a discourse on 
the Exchange of one East India Ship being arrived in Ireland & 3 more coming‟.11 Stock rose 
on this rumour and fell back a little when it could not be confirmed. By mid-November there 
was news that the ships were in Plymouth, at which East India Company stock rose to 98 but 
by 26 November the ships still had not arrived in London and stock retreated to 92, at which 
point Thomas Miller feared that the ships might have been lost and took the sensible decision 
to liquidate Jeake‟s holdings.12 
As this example amply illustrates, nothing could be deemed certain until it could be 
confirmed at first hand. Indeed, de la Vega warned investors that a ship could even sink at 
harbour and thwart their hopes.
13
 Consequently, the more active investor would have found it 
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 necessary to maintain a physical presence in London. This was certainly possible for all 
investors; there were no restrictions on entering the Royal Exchange or any other parts of the 
City. There is even evidence to suggest that some women were able to gather information in 
these places. Cowan notes that Hester Pinney, a thriving businesswoman in the early 
eighteenth century, had few difficulties dealing with the stock-jobbers at Garraway‟s and 
Jonathan‟s and was able to establish and maintain contacts with the West India merchants 
during visits to coffee houses.
14
  Moreover, many women attended lottery draws and art 
auctions at coffee houses indicating that such places were not closed to them. However, 
Cowan does concede that coffeehouses were no place for a lady who wanted to preserve her 
respectability.
15
  
Most participants in the financial market of the late seventeenth century lived either in 
or around London, and the majority of investors did travel to the City in order to complete 
their transactions. With regard to Bank of England stock, for example, in the period between 
August 1694 and December 1702, 94 per cent of sellers and 98 per cent of purchasers were 
present to sign the transfer books.
16
 Records for the other joint-stock companies are not as 
complete, but a similar picture is presented by the East India Company‟s surviving transfer 
books, with 98 per cent of sellers and 99 per cent of buyers being present at time of transfer.
17
  
The main gathering place for those seeking financial information was Exchange Alley 
and its adjacent lanes and streets; the limits of which, according to one contemporary source, 
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 were „easily surrounded in about a minute and a half‟.18 Into this space were crammed the 
chief institutions of the late seventeenth century financial market, namely the Royal 
Exchange, Jonathan‟s and Garraway‟s coffee houses in Exchange Alley, the Bank of England, 
East India House, and Royal African House. Within these places could be found brokers, 
stock-jobbers and investors, professional and otherwise, all vying for information. Within the 
Royal Exchange and in the surrounding areas there were further coffee houses and taverns, 
the premises of traders, merchants and retailers, and the Post Office. Close by were the 
complements to the financial market – goldsmith bankers, scriveners, and attorneys. Already 
this area of London was beginning to have a specialist purpose that, according to Derek 
Keene, first displaced the trade in material goods and then drove out the residential 
population‟.19 
The Royal Exchange was the heart of this space.
20
 For the merchant or businessman, 
whether resident in London or just visiting, the Royal Exchange was the place to gather 
information, to socialise, to make contacts and to transact business. As the author of the Exact 
Dealer stated in 1688, it was „the proper place of bargaining, and getting knowledge of what 
Commodities are bought in, and to be sold; as also the Intelligence of the Prices, and whether 
the Rate rises or falls‟.21 The Royal Exchange was also the place where official information 
circulated. Displays of public authority took place there. Miscreant businessmen were 
pilloried in front of the Exchange at midday, the time at which commercial activity was at its 
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22
 Government and other notices were posted there and hung „as thick round the Pillars 
of each Walk, as Bells about the Legs of a Morrice-Dancer’.23 Official announcements also 
echoed through the building.
24
 In addition, the Royal Exchange was the home of the infant 
stock exchange. However, as noted in chapter three, the noise and the nature of the business 
rapidly turned it into a nuisance and the brokers removed to Exchange Alley in 1698.  
The information circulating in the Royal Exchange was supplemented by that generated 
in the network of coffee houses and taverns located in its immediate vicinity. These public 
spaces were places of entertainment and refreshment but also furnished the venue for public 
gatherings, auctions and lottery draws, and effectively provided office space for all manner of 
businessmen, merchants and traders. In such places the investor could, for the price of a cup 
of coffee, peruse a large selection of printed material: domestic and foreign news-sheets, 
journals and bulletins, price currents, auction notices and advertisements.
25
 The most 
important information was, however, communicated verbally. Indeed, the debate encouraged 
by the atmosphere of the coffee houses was an important part of the assessment of the market 
value. Dickson saw the constant reappraisal and reassessment of value on the floor of 
Jonathan‟s as an essential aspect of the market and one that provided security, as government 
debt became a commodity that was firmly based upon public discussion and evaluation.
26
 It 
may also be argued that the information to be found in these places was sometimes more 
useful than that available through official channels. Hence, in 1693 the Governor and 
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 Committee of the Hudson‟s Bay Company awarded the sum of £3 to „Mr Loyd the Coffee 
Man [in gratitude] for his Intelligence of the Comp
ies
 Shipps‟.27  
It has been suggested that coffee houses were places where new investors could learn 
about the market from experienced brokers and stock-jobbers. Keene notes the use of coffee 
houses as venues for philosophical and mechanical demonstrations, claiming this as proof of 
their legitimacy as places of learning and information exchange.
28
 Carlos, Key and Dupree 
also identify a direct flow of information from brokers and stock-jobbers to inexperienced 
investors. They suggest that there was „knowledge and ability on the one side and learning by 
individuals on the other‟.29 However, such statements should not be accepted without 
question. In an unregulated market the well-informed have powerful incentives to obstruct or 
divert information flows and contemporary commentators wrote often of the duplicitous 
nature of brokers and stock-jobbers, never of their altruistic tendencies. 
Meetings of the shareholders of the various joint-stock companies provided more 
formal venues for the exchange of financial information. Such meetings were regular but, 
when business was proceeding well, they were not frequent. During the period under 
consideration, the Bank of England‟s Court of Proprietors met quarterly with an additional 
meeting for the election of directors, as did the Court of the New East India Company. The 
Courts of the Old East India, Royal African and Hudson‟s Bay Companies met annually for 
the election of directors and so that a statement of the company‟s financial condition could be 
presented to the shareholders. However, in all cases additional meetings were called as and 
when necessary, and during troubled periods in a company‟s existence shareholders met 
often. For instance, the Bank of England‟s shareholders met twelve times between January 
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 and March 1697 to discuss the government‟s demands for further loans.30 Similarly, the Old 
East India Company‟s General Court met seventeen times between May and July 1698 to 
discuss the threat posed by the New Company.
31
  
It is impossible to be exact about the numbers in attendance at such meetings. The 
Bank did keep lists of the attendees at its General Courts in the period between 1694 and 1697 
but each list usually included the names of only a certain number of shareholders and then the 
list was concluded with the phrase „and others of the generality‟.32 Although it is unclear how 
many „others‟ attended, the lists do indicate that, in general, between five and fifteen per cent 
of those eligible to vote turned out. However, crucial meetings attracted many more people. 
The meeting that took place on 4 January 1697 to discuss a further loan to the government 
attracted more than 200 shareholders, around a quarter of those eligible to vote.
33
  
The Old East India Company did not keep a register of attendees at its General Courts 
but on several occasions at meetings regarding the New Company „a very numerous 
appearance of the Generality‟ was recorded.34 The Royal African and Hudson‟s Bay 
companies‟ meetings were often rather poorly attended but any threats to either company‟s 
stability or profitability could encourage a higher attendance, as could the hint of scandal. In 
December 1692 fifty-four individuals, about a quarter of all shareholders, attended a meeting 
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 to discuss the resignation of the Royal African Company‟s treasurer, Robert Williamson, who 
had confessed to „borrowing‟ the Company‟s money.35  
The presentation of information at such meetings was formalised. In some cases 
meetings were convened merely to confirm that the company‟s affairs were in good order. 
Often when a company was awaiting a decision from Parliament or a response to a petition, 
meetings were convened to notify shareholders that no new information was forthcoming. 
However, at such meetings proprietors were in a position to question the directors of 
companies and the General Courts would have provided the perfect opportunity for like-
minded stockholders to meet and establish further networks of information. There is also 
evidence to suggest that Courts were preceded by other gatherings of shareholders. For 
instance, with reference to the prospect of a dividend being paid by the Bank, Samuel Jeake 
wrote to his wife Elizabeth in October 1697 „To morrow we have a General Court at ye Bank 
& I find most of y
e
 members are for it…‟ indicating that the potential dividend had already 
been much discussed in the City.
36
  
It is finally worth noting that, in the cases of the trading companies, auctions of goods 
provided the shareholders with further opportunities for the gathering of relevant information. 
Indeed, the East India Company held 197 sales of goods during the period under 
consideration, while the General Court met on only 131 occasions.
37
 Auctions not only 
allowed direct observation of the quality of the Company‟s wares and the prices achieved by 
those goods but also allowed those interested in a company‟s prospects to meet, and may have 
provided further occasions for the questioning of directors. The frequency, or infrequency, of 
the auctions also said much about a company‟s present condition and future prospects.  
As the foregoing discussion suggests, although investors seem to have met and 
congregated in Exchange Alley and its immediate environs, there was not necessarily a 
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 centralised place where financial information could be sought and found. Similarly, there does 
not appear to have been one place in which a market in all joint-stock and debt products was 
created by open outcry. In fact there is evidence to suggest that markets existed in a variety of 
places: the Exchange, coffee houses, Grocers Hall - the home of the Bank of England during 
this period, and East India House. The East India Company was even prepared to send its 
transfer book to shareholders‟ homes, if requested. In September 1695, Mr Thorowgood of 
the Company took the transfer book to Mrs Boon at her home since, being „indisposed‟, she 
could not attend at East India House. In May 1696 Mr Thorowgood took the transfer book to 
Wanstead for the convenience of Sir Josiah Child, and in May 1698 he was ordered to take 
the book to the Lord Mayor of London.
38
 Clearly for those who were too sick or too important 
to face the hustle and bustle of Exchange Alley, the market would come to them.  
An incident recorded in Thomas Bowrey‟s surviving papers as a result of a dispute over 
the sale of Linen Company stock gives further insight into the process of negotiating a trade. 
When asked to describe the events preceding the dispute Richard Sweet stated „that on 
Munday morning being y
e
 15
th
 of this Inst. June Mr Henry Million, Senior, came to his house, 
& told him that he understood this deponent was Employed to goe to Mr Tho
s
 Bowrey of 
Wapping & treat with him about his Four shares in y
e
 Linen Manufacture…‟.39 This 
description highlights two points of interest. First, the negotiation of this trade clearly took 
place away from the main sphere of the market. The implication is that Sweet waited upon 
Bowrey at his home or perhaps in a coffee house in Wapping. Secondly, the agreement to 
trade appears to have been the result of a process of negotiation, rather than an acceptance of 
the price offered by a seller or market maker. Perhaps this should not be viewed as surprising; 
Muldrew notes that almost all transactions during the early modern period went through a 
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 bargaining process before being agreed.
40
 Nevertheless, it does seem unlikely that a process of 
negotiation was common to all share transactions during this period. The prices recorded in 
Charles Blunt‟s ledgers showed very little intraday variation implying that once a price had 
been set by the successful conclusion of a trade, that price provided the benchmark for further 
trades on that day, at least among Blunt‟s clients and contacts.41 Even so, it is reasonable to 
suggest that even for those investors located close to the centre of the City, the process of 
finding a market in a particular stock and agreeing upon a price at which to trade was not a 
straight-forward one.   
It also seems probable that the provincial investor and those on the outskirts of London 
would only have moved into the City to conduct their business if they could not do so close to 
home. For the passive investor convenience was undoubtedly a greater concern than price, 
particularly in a market where, for long periods of time, some stocks were relatively stable. In 
August 1697, for instance, John Hill, a cooper from Southwark, sold £385 Bank of England 
stock to Edward Wade and £100 Bank stock to Thomas Sodon; both Wade and Sodon were 
also coopers and also from Southwark, suggesting that this deal was not agreed in Exchange 
Alley.
42
 Additionally, the East India Company‟s transfer books show a number of trades 
executed in 1691 in the county of Essex between John Morley, a butcher from Little 
Maplestead, Edward Ingram a gentleman from Halstead and John Barnard, a draper from 
Coggleshall.
43
 These villages stand in relatively close proximity to one another and it is 
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 probable that the counterparties knew of each other‟s interest in East India Company stock 
and resolved to trade among themselves in order to avoid the need for a journey to the City.
44
  
These examples should not be taken as evidence of separately functioning regional 
markets. A close examination of the Bank of England‟s transfer books shows that 66 per cent 
of buyers and 76 per cent of sellers who resided outside of the City transacted with a 
counterparty who gave an address within the City.
45
 It is also possible that where a transaction 
involved both a buyer and a seller who were resident outside the City contact was still made 
within the environs of Exchange Alley. Notably, only around eleven per cent of buyers and 
sellers living in Westminster traded with a counterparty who was also resident in that part of 
London.
46
 Smaller populations of investors made finding a suitable counterparty even more 
difficult. Thus, among investors living in the north of England, only one transaction was 
conducted between parties living in the same area. In November 1701 Jane Hussey, a spinster 
of Caythorp in Lincolnshire sold £100 Bank stock to Anne Hussey, also a spinster and 
probably Jane‟s sister.47 Yet, despite the understandable difficulties that the provincial 
investor would have faced in finding someone to trade with in his or her immediate locality, it 
is clear that the City did not command a monopoly of the trade in joint-stocks or government 
debt. 
 
Noise and confusion 
 
Those who traded away from Exchange Alley sacrificed the price advantage that a larger 
market with a greater number of actors would have offered. In part investors were prepared to 
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 make that sacrifice because of a lack of trust in financial information and an understandable 
inability to comprehend price movements. Their wariness was intensified by the nature of the 
market. When brokers and stock-jobbers met, the result was noise and confusion. The 
financial market encouraged „uninterrupted, simultaneous, overlapping, rude, quick talk‟,48 
which made the information conveyed difficult to follow and assimilate. Contemporary plays 
sometimes depicted the antics of stock-jobbers and can give some idea of the way that 
information was presented to early modern investors. The following is from a scene set in 
Jonathan‟s coffee house during the South Sea Bubble: 
 
5
th
 Brok: Hoop Petticoat, Bubble – 
2d Brok: Your Price for Hoop Petticoat? 
5
th
 Brok: Forty per Cent.  
2d Brok: I‟ll give it, let me have all it covers.  
5
th
 Brok: You shall have it Sir, to a Hair –  
6
th
 Brok: Flying Ships – who Buys? 
Sev Brok: We all Buy – how d‟ye Sell? 
6
th
 Brok: One Hundred Per Cent.  
Sev. Brok: There‟s Earnest.  
New Cryers run a-cross the end of the room in great haste, tumbling over one 
another.  
1
st
 News Cr: News from France, Spain, and Italy.  
2d News Cr: Great News from Rome – An Account of the Deaths and last Wills 
and Testament of the Pope, and all his Cardinals.  
3d News Cr: Great News! – Good News from the North! – The Czar of Muscovy 
a Dying at his Capital of Petersburg.  
(The Stock-Jobbers buy and talk merrily together.)
49
    
 
Although the market was often quiet, allowing negotiations to be conducted at a relaxed pace, 
at times when unexpected news broke prices would have changed quickly. On such occasions 
and within a scattered market it would have been extremely difficult for the inexperienced 
investor to keep track of price movements.  
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 The language of the market added to the sense of bewilderment. The language used by 
brokers and stock-jobbers was new and complex. They used nicknames to describe stocks and 
shorthand forms to describe activities. One historian speculates that such language must have 
sounded like „baffling incantations chanted by a strange new sect practising its mysterious 
rites…‟.50 For Defoe the language of the market was not just baffling, it was designed to 
perpetuate fraud against the ordinary citizen, to „Fiddle them out of their Money, by the 
strange and unheard of Engines of Interests, Discounts, Transfers, Tallies, Debentures, 
Shares, Projects, and the Devil and all of Figures and hard Names‟.51 Before investors could 
engage fully in the process of gathering information, therefore, they had to master the 
complexities of the language of the market and learn to keep pace with the rapid changes that 
occurred. It should, however, be understood that for the speculator the sounds of the market 
could have been very revealing. Excited babble, angry shouting, and hushed conversations all 
hinted at deals to be done or secrets to be kept. For any individual coming to the market 
regularly the first thing to do would have been to listen to its sounds.   
Investors who did learn to understand the workings of the market faced numerous other 
obstacles in their search for reliable information. Information about the general state of the 
English economy could not easily be found. Certainly, the late seventeenth century was a time 
of increasing interest in the gathering of information about the economy. The constraints of 
war particularly encouraged the gathering of economic data with a view to increasing the 
efficiency of tax assessment and collection. Nevertheless, according to Brewer, the new 
science of political arithmetic promised more than it delivered. The work of political 
arithmeticians lacked rigour and discrimination. Their findings were often inaccurate and 
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 consequently provided little that could have been used by investors seeking a broad view of 
the economy.
52
  
The quality of information produced by joint-stock companies was similarly 
questionable. There was a culture of secrecy within some companies. The East India 
Company was notable in this regard. At times when the Company was experiencing 
difficulties or was in the process of complex negotiations, it insisted that its directors keep the 
details of their meetings secret. In February 1690, for example, after „long and serious 
Debates‟ regarding the sending of an ambassador to sue for peace in India and the petitioning 
of Parliament for the renewal of the Company‟s charter, it was „Resolved that this dayes 
Debate be kept secret‟.53 But there are indications that such practices were both long-standing 
and common among joint-stock companies. The Hudson‟s Bay Company concealed evidence 
of private sales of furs and swore its Committee and General Court to secrecy over the 
matter.
54
 Willan‟s study of the Russia Company also found evidence of concealment of 
relevant facts. In 1597 Robert Dove, one of the oldest members of the Company wrote to 
Lord Burghley „when Mr Merrick our agent in Russia hath to certify of any matter that he 
thinks not meet to be written to the Company generally, he writes the same privately to me to 
emparte with such of them as I think best‟.55 Such secrecy would have been considered at the 
time to be perfectly legitimate. Indeed, for the Russia Company the combination of commerce 
and diplomacy made secrecy essential. Similarly, during the 1690s the East India Company‟s 
reticence stemmed from a desire not to give further ammunition to those who sought to 
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 remove its monopoly. Nevertheless, the concealment of pertinent facts did not facilitate the 
decision-making processes of those who held stock or planned to purchase it in the future.  
Even when companies did publish pertinent information it was not necessarily to be 
relied upon. Errors in financial planning were unavoidable given the facilities and knowledge 
available to early modern company directors.
56
 Companies commonly overstretched their 
resources, failed to make adequate provision for unforeseen circumstances and over-estimated 
their potential revenues. Overseas trading companies faced a myriad of problems when 
seeking information from foreign outposts. With reference to the East India Company, 
Chaudhuri noted that natural disasters and unforeseen circumstances could extend the 16 
month period taken for ships to complete the round trip from London to Asia. Also badly 
worded or poorly structured letters hampered understanding, particularly those that made 
obscure references: „as if because they know these things, it necessarily follows that we must 
also‟. Moreover, when information was received, the sheer volume made analysis and timely 
action difficult.
57
 All these factors would have made it impossible to provide a reasoned 
analysis of future profitability.  
Nor was there much agreement about how assets should be valued. Hence in 1696 when 
the East India Company presented a valuation of its net assets to the House of Lords, its 
calculations were challenged on almost every point. The Company‟s valuation of £1,224,502 
was adjusted by the Lords to a mere £217,721.
58
 Contemporary commentators seemed to agree 
with the lower estimate. One suggested that the East India Company‟s stock „in India, upon 
the Sea, and at Home, is of no real Value, and hardly sufficient to pay their Debts‟.59 Ned 
Ward asserted that „Were a schedule of their effects scored on one side and their Indian debts 
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 scored on the other, it is believed more bad debts would arise upon the reverse than are due to 
tradesmen from all the persons of quality in town…‟.60 
As a result of such problems, few potential investors would have regarded the value of a 
company‟s assets as a key determinant of stock price. Indeed, in 1681 Sir Josiah Child 
complained:  
…when we tell gentlemen, or others, they may buy [East India Company] stock, and 
come into the Company when they please: they presently reply, they know that, but 
then they must also pay 280 l. for 100 l. And when we say the intrinsic value is worth 
so much; which is as true as 2 and 2 makes 4, yet it is not so soon demonstrated to 
their apprehensions, notwithstanding it is no hard task to make out…61 
 
As a further example, in January 1695 the Royal African Company stated to its shareholders 
that the stock of the Company and its profits amounted to £248,099 11s. 1d. thus indicating, 
by the Company‟s own calculation, that the stock should have been valued at around £40.62 At 
that time Royal African Company stock was actually trading at a price of £24 and it continued 
its slow decline thereafter, suggesting that investors took little notice of information that 
contradicted their long-term view of a company‟s potential.63  
Some commentators were puzzled by the gap between market prices and estimated 
intrinsic value. Daniel Defoe commented that East India Company stock had been:  
sold from 300 l. per cent. to 37 l. per cent. from thence with fluxes and refluxes, as 
frequent as the tides, it has been up at 150 l. per cent. again; during all which 
differences, it would puzzle a very good artist to prove, that their real stock (if they 
have any) set loss and gain together, can have varied above 10 per cent. upon the 
whole.
64
 
 
But those closer to the market were more insightful about the reasons for such price 
fluctuations. In 1691 one pamphleteer listed the fundamental factors that should have 
depressed the price of the stock in the main trading companies. He noted that the East India, 
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 Royal African and Hudson‟s Bay Companies were suffering as a result of „war with private 
traders, …greater risks, higher freight and new duties, [and]…taxes, etc.‟ but asserted that it 
was not those factors that governed prices, rather „they rise and fall as the humours of the 
buyers increase or abate…‟.65 John Houghton too argued that stock prices very often reacted 
„according to hopes or fears‟ suggesting that early modern investors had a very keen 
awareness that market psychology was an important consideration when making investment 
decisions.
66
 
Market psychology was also used by those who preyed upon the hopes and fears of 
investors by spreading false information. This was a considerable problem since the financial 
market of the late seventeenth century encompassed no authority to regulate the dissemination 
of data. As such, those who spread misinformation went unpunished and deliberate attempts to 
deceive investors were frequent. The most famous incident of this period concerned the siege 
of the town of Mons. During early 1691 the town of Mons was besieged by Louis XIV‟s 
armies. It fell to the French on 29 March 1691, but on 31 March a man dressed as a Dutch 
officer rode through London crying out that William III had relieved the town. It was alleged 
that this was a deliberate deception to allow those who had gambled on the relief of the town 
to call in their „winnings‟ before the real outcome of the siege was made known.67 Nor was 
this the only incidence of such manipulation. Defoe alleged that „Stock-Jobbing Brokers‟ 
could govern the number of buyers and sellers active in the market and make the prices of 
stock „dance attendance on their designs, and rise and fall as they please, without any regard to 
the Intrinsick worth of the Stock‟.68  
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 Such incidents ensured that the information provided by brokers and stock-jobbers was 
widely distrusted, yet investors were also forced to question the veracity of official 
information. A relevant example is offered by Israel who cites a letter written by an 
Englishman in Amsterdam to a fellow countryman who was a member of the international 
diplomatic community at The Hague. He wrote,  
There are here some Actionists in the [Dutch] East India Company who, knowing of 
the honour I have to be known to your Excellency these many years, doe by me 
propose a handsome gratification if you think fitt to give them the first and best 
intelligence of things so farre as they may be usefull to give an influence to their way 
of trade : this I presume to propose daring to think that, as Your Honour would not 
expose the mysteries and main secrets of the state, so, on the other side, I am bold to 
thinke that such a correspondency prudently and cunningly managed in this city would 
be able to doe the King [of England] a great deale of service by making these men to 
hazard their stocks and ruine themselves….69  
 
It is not easy to find evidence of such deliberate official misinformation, but there are 
suggestions that the practice existed. Samuel Jeake wrote in May 1699 of a report of the King 
of Spain‟s death that was „not much credited as coming from the French Ambassador‟.70 In a 
letter to John Ellis dated 14 August 1688 it was noted that,   
Last week arrived from the East Indies one Dr. St. Johns, who has been there for some 
years as Judge of the Admiralty for the East India Company. He is said to give an 
account of affairs in those parts, that is quite different from what was published in the 
Gazette, and not at all comfortable for the nation, at least for those concerned in the 
same bottom with the Company.
71
    
 
Trust in official sources of information was, therefore, likely to have been very limited.  
Thus, early modern investors faced many barriers that would have prevented them 
gaining full information about the prospects for any stock or debt product. Information 
circulated in an extended market, lines of communication remained slow and news from both 
official and unofficial sources was subject to manipulation. Furthermore, the presentation of 
information during this period was problematic. The new language of the market was 
complex, making it difficult for inexperienced investors to understand the choices offered to 
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 them. Problems in assimilating information would have been compounded by the fact that the 
data available to investors could not have encompassed all pertinent information. Few joint-
stock companies could have made precise predictions about future profits, accounts were 
seldom made public and the uncertain nature of the political and economic situation in the 
1690s made it impossible to make accurate business projections.  
 
Creating networks of information  
 
The need to overcome these barriers ensured that few active investors would have been able 
to remain passive recipients of news.
72
 Indeed, the difficulties of accessing and verifying 
information led some individuals to create their own networks of information. Sir Henry 
Furnese seems to have been particularly adept in this respect, „establishing a kind of Reuter‟s 
service on a private scale‟.73 Josiah and Francis Child instituted similar measures. Most 
notably, they apparently established a private express service from the south of Ireland that 
gave them early news about the arrival of East India Company ships.
74
 Creating networks of 
this kind naturally required a significant amount of money and influence. However, the 
above-mentioned individuals had a formidable reputation in the financial market suggesting 
that their efforts were worthwhile.
75
  
Other investors operated in a more limited sphere, but dedicated comparable resources 
to the search for information. For example, John Verney began his working day „at the 
Exchange at eight o‟clock precisely, and thence…to two or three merchants‟ houses, and 
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 before ten I must be at [the] custom-house to attend the Commissioners‟.76 Along the route of 
Verney‟s daily walk were the premises of the Royal African Company and East India House. 
Verney also visited Lombard Street, where goldsmiths and scriveners had their businesses, 
Exchange Alley and Jonathan‟s and Garraway‟s coffee houses, and frequently wandered 
along Cheapside, with its many retail outlets, to the book sellers in St Paul‟s Churchyard. 
Verney‟s walks were not aimless meanderings. He worked hard to obtain relevant data and 
clearly studied that data. Whyman particularly notes that he kept coded lists of ships, captains 
and cargoes.
77
 On the other hand his walks were not just taken for the purpose of finding news 
relevant to his business; they also had a social purpose. Like most merchants of the time 
Verney relied heavily on social networks of information and his friendships could also 
influence his investment decisions. His friendship with Sir Gabriel Roberts, for example, 
brought him new opportunities for profit and Verney clearly followed Roberts‟ lead when 
selecting investment strategies.
78
 Verney‟s networks of information also extended outwards as 
he communicated the news that he gathered to his own family and friends.  
As Samuel Jeake‟s preparations for the purchase of East India stock in 1694 suggest, 
provincial investors faced different costs. In order to keep himself informed about price 
movements and prospects for the stock, Jeake was forced to rely upon letters from his 
business associate and friend Thomas Miller. Miller‟s letters from London generally arrived 
in Rye two days after they were sent,
79
 which meant that any information was already old 
news when it reached Jeake. When Jeake did finally decide to purchase stock, these postal 
delays proved detrimental to his profits. His letter, dated 28 July 1694, instructing Miller to 
buy East India stock at 70 arrived too late, and by the time Miller replied on 2 August the 
stock had already risen to 76; a further instruction to buy at 77 was no more successful, and it 
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 was not until 10 September that Miller confirmed that the stock had been purchased at a price 
of 80, a full ten points higher than Jeake‟s original target.80    
During subsequent periods of investment activity Jeake took up residence in London, 
excusing his extended absence to his wife by writing‚ „You know ye greatest of our concerns 
are now here, if they were not I should not stay from you‟.81  During his time in London Jeake 
established a number of contacts in the financial market. He attended the Bank of England‟s 
General Court on a number of occasions, met with brokers, and attended a meeting of the 
holders of Million Lottery tickets.
82
 Jeake also passed the information he gathered on to his 
wife and to other friends and relations in Rye, thus, creating his own networks of 
information.
83
 However, while the establishment of these networks may have facilitated 
profitable trading in shares and debt, there were other costs to be considered. The necessity of 
leaving his wife Elizabeth to control business in Rye caused several problems. Money was 
lost when Elizabeth accepted the wrong price for guineas and on several occasions 
opportunities in Jeake‟s main business were lost through his absence from Rye.84 Full 
information could, therefore, be costly for the early modern investor.  
For those with less time to establish networks of information a broker could offer a dual 
service; firstly by imparting up-to-date information and advice and, secondly, by arranging 
contact with a suitable counterparty for each transaction. Thomas Mortimer, writing in 1761, 
asserted that this process could, and should, have been circumvented since it was easy for an 
investor to seek out his own counterparty,
85
 but in the less liquid market of the 1690s this may 
not have been a simple process. Thomas Bowrey clearly found it necessary to use brokers to 
complete his transactions; his surviving papers include a number of brokerage receipts. 
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 Indeed, during 1695 Bowrey paid brokerage to seven different brokers, with the total cost of 
the seventeen trades conducted in that year being nearly £20.
86
 The fact that Bowrey used a 
number of different brokers may suggest that these individuals were specialising in a 
particular stock or instrument, but in a developing market such diversity is more likely to be 
indicative of the difficulties of accessing information and the problems of finding other 
investors with whom to trade.  
The clearest information about the activities of brokers during London‟s first stock 
market boom comes from Charles Blunt‟s surviving ledgers. Over a four year period, between 
January 1692 and August 1695 Blunt served as intermediary for 156 individuals in relation to 
just under 1,500 trades in the shares of 23 different companies. It is interesting to note that 
Blunt was acting almost solely as an intermediary. He appeared as the counterparty in only six 
of the trades listed in his ledgers. During 1692, his busiest year, Blunt acted as an 
intermediary for 105 clients. Some traded with Blunt only once, Sir Thomas Estcourt traded 
through Blunt 115 times, but most of Blunt‟s clients dealt through him sporadically.87  
This sporadic activity was, in great part, a result of the nature of the market. As will be 
seen in the following chapters, few participants traded actively and those who did were 
Blunt‟s fellow professionals. The cost of brokerage was also prohibitive. As a general rule, 
Thomas Bowrey paid five shillings for each £100 nominal stock traded, although the cost of 
more complex trades, such as time bargains or refusals, seems to have been variable.
88
 Blunt 
charged 10s. per share, or per £100 nominal in Bank, East India, Royal African and Hudson‟s 
Bay Company stock on any type of transaction and thus, for some of his clients, his services 
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 became quite costly.
89
 In 1692 the average yearly brokerage bill among Blunt‟s clients was 
£14 17s.; Sir Thomas Estcourt paid £251 in that year.
90
 
The question of whether a broker‟s services were worth such a high cost is difficult to 
answer. It is evident that Blunt offered a good service to his clients since he was able to attract 
the business of some of the most prominent stock-jobbers of the period.
91
 He also acted as 
broker to both parties to the trade in around one-third of the transactions recorded in his 
ledgers, suggesting that he had very good contacts in the market and was not reliant on other 
brokers to supply counterparties for his clients. Moreover, Blunt did not offer discounted rates 
to his loyal customers, in spite of the fact that some of them accumulated large annual bills. 
Thus he was confident of his value to his clients and evidently did not fear that they would be 
lured away by cheaper competitors. 
It should not be doubted that, for some, establishing a close relationship with a broker 
could pay dividends. Blunt‟s clients were offered just such a golden opportunity in February 
1693 when he acted as broker in the initial offering of shares in „Certain Lead Mines and 
Stocks vested in John Lethieullier Esq., and others‟, more popularly known as Estcourt‟s Lead 
Mine. The initial price of the shares was £10 in February 1693 but by mid-1694 the price was 
being quoted by Houghton at £150.
92
 Those who retained their stock realised a significant 
profit. It is also significant that of the twenty-two individuals listed in Blunt‟s ledgers as being 
among the initial subscribers to the mine, only four were not already regular clients.
93
 Clearly, 
therefore, Blunt‟s loyal customers were offered first refusal of this lucrative opportunity. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between client and broker is a complex one. The broker‟s 
loyalties are divided between the profit margins of his clients and his own desire to make 
money, and a broker bringing together two clients must run the risk of being accused of 
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 favouring one over the other, particularly when the outcome of a transaction is adverse. 
Illustrative of this dilemma is the fact that many of Blunt‟s clients who subscribed to 
Estcourt‟s Lead Mine were soon afterwards duped into selling options that gave away their 
rights to further participation in a rising market.  
Given the uncertainties of dealing with brokers and the expense of paying brokerage, 
most investors would only have used a broker when a counterparty was not forthcoming by 
other means or when it was necessary to purchase information. Indeed, many of the deals 
recorded by Blunt were option trades, time bargains or loans backed by stock, indicating that 
the intermediation of a broker was found to be most useful in circumstances where the trade 
was complex or required negotiation.
94
 It is also notable that East India Company stock and 
Bank stock featured barely at all in Blunt‟s ledgers. These much more actively traded stocks 
must have allowed most investors to make their own arrangements. An analysis of Blunt‟s 
profits in the period between 1692 and 1695 is also enlightening. During 1692 Blunt was paid 
£1,866 in brokerage, and in 1693 he received £2,329 but gross income dropped considerably 
in 1694 and 1695 when he was paid just £490 and £79 respectively.
95
 Clearly, therefore, 
during the stock market boom of the early 1690s the broker was an invaluable resource but 
the advent of the more easily accessible public funds and the decline of the private joint-stock 
company must have resulted in the decline or failure of many brokerage businesses.   
Most of those who dealt with Blunt were active investors but a broker might also have 
been useful to the passive investor for whom maintaining a presence in the City would have 
been costly and difficult. Blunt numbered several women among his clients, including Mary 
Crawley and Sarah Wind, both of whom traded very infrequently in Linen Company stock.
96
 
However, given the arcane language of the market and the general distrust of speculators and 
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 stock-jobbers, it may be suggested that the passive or inexperienced investor would have 
eschewed the advice of market professionals in favour of seeking the counsel of friends, 
relations or, perhaps, an acquaintance with a connection to the market. Partial confirmation of 
this may be found in the Bank of England‟s transfer books, which record many occasions on 
which family members traded together. On 19 December 1699, for example, Charles 
Killigrew and Colonel Robert Killigrew both sold £500 Bank of England stock.
97
 In March 
1700 Dame Jane Smith and her daughters Jane and Sarah, all of Isleworth in Middlesex, sold 
a total of £1,200 Bank stock between them.
98
 Frances and Grace Barnham, both spinsters 
from Maidstone in Kent were among the original subscribers to the Bank of England and in 
March 1700 both made the decision to liquidate their holdings.
99
 It would seem, in these 
cases, that the decision to buy and sell stock was a result of deliberation within the family.  
Those acting as attorneys for individuals were often friends or relations, rather than 
professional brokers. Certainly professionals were instructed. Dame Mary Ashe placed her 
affairs in the hands of Joseph Wilson, a London goldsmith, and Dame Rebecca Atkins used 
the services of Phesaunt Crisp, a broker. However, Alice Spencer, a spinster resident in 
Hertfordshire appointed her brother John as attorney; he acted for Alice on many occasions. 
Captain Henry Robinson, Commander of His Majesty‟s ship Hampton Court, put power of 
attorney in the hands of his wife, as did Peter Causton, a minor stock-jobber.
100
 Samuel Jeake 
on extended visits to London in 1697 and 1699 acted for his mother-in-law and for other 
business associates and acquaintances in Rye and, in turn, regularly placed his own affairs in 
the hands of his „loving friend‟ Thomas Miller.101  
Whether networks of information were created through market professionals or friends 
and family there was, due to the necessity of finding someone to trust, a tendency to form 
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 relationships with the providers of news. In some instances the very close connections 
developed in the financial market of the 1690s were an advantage for investors. Blunt‟s 
favoured clients were offered a golden opportunity that was unavailable to the investing 
public at large. However, the existence of such close social bonds within a market is also 
highly problematic. To ensure perfect competition, markets should be impersonal. Given the 
nature of the information that circulated in the early modern market and the frequent 
accusations of malfeasance made by contemporary commentators, it is reasonable to suggest 
that the social networks favoured at this time allowed, and even encouraged, the manipulation 
of share prices.  
  
Summary  
 
When creating networks of information three factors were important for the early modern 
investor: accessibility, trust and cost. Whilst it is certain that all were able to access the 
London market, the difficulties associated with travelling to London, the barriers raised by the 
complex language of the market and the general distrust of brokers and stock-jobbers would 
have meant that many investors preferred to gather market information from friends, relatives 
and trusted associates. For those who chose to engage with the market more actively, 
information proved costly in monetary terms, and as well as in terms of time and 
commitment. Full information was restricted to those willing and able to make a full-time 
commitment to the market or those, like Sir Henry Furnese, with the resources to create their 
own information networks. This created a two-tiered market in which „insiders‟ commanded 
superior access to information and thus were perhaps in a position to manipulate the market to 
their own ends. „Outsiders‟ had to be content with acting on older, less reliable information, 
which must have sometimes detrimentally affected their ability to take advantage of new 
opportunities and often restricted their investment choices.  
